Television broadcasting was introduced in Israel late, after years of debate over its likely effects.
those of its opponents than with its proponents.
Thus, the trouble with trying to analyze the effects of 20 years of television is that this same 20-year period also includes two wars, a doubling of the population, and an increase in the level of general education such that the society, on average, is three years more educated than in 1970. Moreover, 1977 saw the first overturn of Israeli politics from left to right and the coming to political maturity of the second generation of immigrants from Asian and African countries. The new parity between citizens of Eastern and Western background challenged not only the long-standing political consensus, but also the (predominantly Western) cultural order. During the 20-year period, an additional hour of leisure was added to the day, a second day off from work was given (Friday) and a rise in the standard of living achieved. To study the long-run effects of television, therefore, one has to know how to sort out the effects of television from those of war, affluence, education, political change, cultural pluralism and so on! Having sounded the warning, let us proceed nevertheless to examine changing trends in the values and cultural practices of Jewish Israelis over these twenty years, and to speculate about the extent to which they may be attributable to television. 1 To accomplish this, the paper will proceed as follows: (1) it will present an overview of the ways in which television broadcasting was institutionalized in Israel;
(2) it will consider the patterns of television viewing; (3) it will report on major changes in the patterns of consuming culture and the arts, including reading; (4) it will review the study's findings concerning value changes in Israeli society during this period; (5) it will report on the changes in the functions and gratifications provided by the media, old and new, with respect to these values. Having done so, we shall return to weigh the possible long-run effects of television.
Television: The Israeli Version
From its inception, broadcasting in Israel was a monopoly service provided at first by the Government, and, from 1965, by a BBC-like authority financed by a license fee and directed by a Board of Governors representing the political spectrum but independent of Government. When television was established in 1968, joining radio as one of the services of the monopolistic Israel Broadcasting Authority (IB), Israel Television operated only one channel-which it yielded during the daytime hours to the Educational Broadcasting service of the Ministry of Education. Cable television by subscription was introduced in the early 90s, and a second over-the-air channel (like the British ITV) was introduced in 1993, financed by advertising but overseen by a public Board, different from that of the IBA.
Before the very recent introduction of multiple channels, Israel TV had excelled in coverage of news and public affairs, although this achievement was sometimes impeded by the overly politicized appointments of the Governing Board and of the Director General. As good as it was at public affairs, it was poor, at best, in original drama and light entertainment. Jokers used to say that Israel television could well do without drama and entertainment, since there is plenty of that in the news.
In its best days, the main 9 pm news attracted 70% of the population on an average evening. Critics and advocates of multiple channels objected that a society cannot claim to be democratic if it has only one television channel and one major news bulletin. Yet, the evidence shows that this highly politicized society collected itself for the nightly news magazine and willingly accepted its agenda for political discussion. There was no evidence of brainwashing: hawks and doves, Jews and Arabs viewed the monopolistic news magazine, believed it on the whole, and used it to talk politics not only in like-thinking groups but across political divisions. 2 Indeed, the 9 pm news magazine became a sort of civic ritual during which the society communed with itself. There was an informal norm that attendance was "required," and that there were to be no intrusions during the news-no telephone calls, for example. American politicians now are talking wishfully about how to organize "electronic town meetings"
-having blithely exchanged their three channels for hundreds. Rather than undemocratic, the lesson of 15 years of Israel TV is that participatory democracy may be enhanced, rather than impeded, by gathering its citizens in a single public space set aside for receiving and discussing reliable reports on the issues of the day.
The introduction of multiple channels has changed the picture.
The heavy emphasis on news and public affairs has given way to much lighter entertainment on the new channels. Even the many cheap-to produce political talk shows are sprinkled with very high doses of sensation, scandal, personalities, provocations, and pop. And advertising interrupts everything. Ironically, the introduction of a competing news magazine (at the same hour as the original) has lowered the total number of viewers of both programs-as if the very offer of choice abolished the norm of collective viewing of the television news.
Like in other countries-not only the smaller ones-a high percentage of television programming is imported from abroad, especially from the United States. The new second channel promised to commission many more programs from local producers, but with double the hours of broadcasting, the overall ratio of domestic to imported programming has declined, if anything, to well below 50%.
If one also takes account of the dozen or more cable channels-now reaching some 60% of the population-the proportion of homemade programming is tiny.
The idea that fewer hours of broadcasting might result in better programs does not occur to anybody. Since its inception in 1968, Israel TV has gone from three nights per week of experimental broadcasting, to six nights per week, and, after a religious/political/ cultural battle over Sabbath-eve broadcasting, to seven nights. The next frontier was breakfast television. And with the inauguration of cable channels and the second over-the-air channel, television in
Israel has become the non-stop public utility so familiar in the rest of the world.
The Viewers
Apart from a few religious and secular ascetics, every home (94%) has a television set, and the modal viewing time is 2-3 hours.
More telling, perhaps, is that one third of the leisure time of adult Israelis is spent viewing television. There are five hours unspoken for on working days, of which an average of 1.7 hours go to viewing TV, and of the combined 14. 
Cultural Practices, 1970-1990
Has television affected other forms of consuming culture?
What about the arts?
It is important to recall at this point that the amount of time Ironically, the box-offices are unaware that there has been a decline in per capita consumption of the arts. The reason they don't notice is because the population has doubled, so that in 1990 the theater and concert halls are as full as they were in 1970! Only we, the researchers, know that a sea-change is in progress! Employing a variety of measures it can be shown that the scope of the audience, or frequency of attendance, or both, have lowered the extent of involvement in the institutions of "high" culture. Nobody is surprised that cinema attendance is down-casually putting the blame on television-but the same drop applies to theater, concerts, museums, etc.
Before making the wrong interpretation, however, it should be added that attendance at sporting events is also down. In 1990, per capita attendance at such events is lower than it was in 1970-both in scope and in frequency.
By contrast, there has been a rise, between 1970 and 1990, in the rate of going to pubs, eating out in restaurants, domestic and foreign travel, and participatory sports.
Our reading of these findings suggests that there is a decline in what may be called spectacle and a rise in those activities that are active, interactive, intimate, where participants bring their own programs along. In other words, there is a decline in those things which require one to sit in a particular place at a particular time, to watch a curtain go up and listen to some professional performer deliver a message from the stage. Correspondingly, leisure pursuits that have to do with activity, interactivity, flexible time, one's own small group and one's own agenda are on the rise.
Let us consider whether television may be to "blame."
Television might explain these changes in the sense that it has given us an overdose of spectacle. People are fed up with staring; there's enough spectacle in the living-room, and when one goes outside the home one looks for something different. When people do go out they want to do more than stare. They want to be active, interactive, intimate, creative, and so on.
Any explanation, of course, would have to account for the decline in reading as well. Clearly, reading is not a spectacle. Nor does television displace the functions of reading, as we shall see. But reading does involve a lot of looking, and so perhaps the explanation does apply-at least until we find a better one.
Another possibility is that television satiates the appetite for the arts and the other media. We would all intuitively agree that cinema attendance has been hurt by television. The fact is, however, that people are seeing more, not fewer, films than they did in 1970, but they are seeing them on TV. This may be equally true for theater, concerts, sports, even museums, as well as reading fiction and reading news. The arts, especially cinema, are the content of television.
According to McLuhan's (1964) rule, each new medium incorporates its predecessor as content. Perhaps television gratifies these needs for experience of the arts.
One must also take account of the alleged decline of the performing arts in other countries, too. 5 Of course, television may be the cause here as well, but a competing explanation would suggest that the culture of pluralism and postmodernism has challenged the Western canon and shaken up the entrenched hierarchy of "high" and "popular" art. It may be that people--even the upwardly mobile--don't "have to" prefer Beethoven to rock any more. We have already noted the coming of age of the second generation of Israelis whose parents originate from Africa and Asia, and the highest drop in arts participation is among the Israeli-born of 20-30 years, not only among those of Eastern origin but among those of Western parentage as well.
The fact that the decline is no less strong among the Western groups born to television rekindles the possibility that television may be a cause.
What we are suggesting is that television may have preempted At the outset, it should be emphasized that the society is very traditional on the whole. Compared to other western-oriented societies, family, nation and collectivity are very important, as is connection with the religious tradition. National and traditional holidays involve almost everyone, whether in religious or secular guise. Escapism is very low. But changes are taking place, slowly but surely.
We asked a series of value questions in this national survey about the "importance" Israelis attribute (1) to self, (2) to family,
to friends, (4) to state and (5) to peoplehood. Questions touched on affective and cognitive aspects in each of these realms. We asked, for example: How important is it for you to know yourself, to want to study, to make your day an orderly one, to feel that you are using your time well, to strive for a higher living standard, to escape from everyday reality, to overcome loneliness, and so on. This is the domain of self-concern. For the primary group area, we asked about the importance, cognitively and emotionally, of spending time with family and friends. With respect to state and people, we asked how important is it to you to understand what's going on in the world?
How important is it to you to understand the true character of our political leaders? How important is it to you to believe in our leaders, feel pride in our state, and so on.
Many of the changes are small but consistent and significant; a few are very sharp. Table I displays these changes over time. Overall, there is an increase in concern for self and a decreased concern for society and state. There is more egoism than there was 20 years ago.
Although concern for the future is still predominant, concern for the present has risen sharply. Pleasure is more highly valued, and there is an increase in the valuation of leisure as compared with work. Indeed, the importance of leisure is now more or less equivalent to the importance of work, whereas in 1970 work was more important than leisure, future was far more important than present. In sum, there is a.
rise in what might be called hedonism and individualism, and in the legitimacy of concern with self. These are big words for small changes, but they are very clear in the data Their counterpart-the decline in collectivity-oriented values-may be observed in the lesser importance attributed to feelings of belonging to the larger society in matters such as the values of "having confidence in our leaders," "feeling that I am participating in current affairs," and "having pride in our state," although the latter is still at the top of the list. Organizational and political membership has experienced a decline. While the family retains its high place at both time periods, and is highly correlated with orientation to the collectivity, the value of spending time with friends has taken a major leap, and we know, from our study, that friends pull towards pleasure and pluralism and away from the burdens of the collectivity (Katz, Trope, and Haas, 1984) . There is also a large increase in concern with "overcoming loneliness when I am alone at home."
Just as we asked in the case of changing cultural practices, we asked again in the case of changing values: does television have any share in these changes? Is television to "blame" in any way for the slow invasion of individualism and hedonism? It seems a fair guess that the answer is no. No one can deny that in its twenty years of existence as the sole national channel, Israel TV has demonstrated an incredible ability to seat the society together every night, to celebrate national achievements and religious occasions, indeed, to symbolize "togetherness."
In fact, if television has had any influence on values, we propose that it may have slowed these new trends. Rather than promoting individualism, pluralism or hedonism, it is more likely to have held them back, while reinforcing the sense of belonging to the civic sphere and the nostalgia for collectivity that permeates movements of national liberation such as Zionism. It is true that the opponents of television forecast a rise in self-oriented concerns and a decline in collectivistic ones: that the personal will supplant the collective, that egoism will displace altruism, that pleasure will uproot dedication. The only trouble with the prediction is that it does not at all correspond to the message of the first twenty years of Israel television, or to the shared experience it offered.
Function of Television and the Other Media
To To do so, we asked respondents to assess the helpfulness of each of five media-radio, television, book, newspaper, cinema-for satisfying each of the "values" outlined in the previous section (and in That television has displaced the newspaper as the most diversified medium is not so surprising. The important point is that it ranks ahead of the other media in the area of the collectivity, especially in the emotional aspect of attachment to nation and people.
More surprising, perhaps, is that television is rated the medium most helpful in satisfying national values that are not only affective but cognitive, i.e. not only "to feel pride in our state" but "to understand the true character of our leaders". The book, for its part, has retained all of its functions and even increased slightly in the number of important concerns it is thought to serve. Although the frequency of reading (not the overall percentage of readers) has declined somewhat, the book is holding its own from a functional point of view. Substantively, we can say that the book best fulfills functions related to self, especially affective ones. It is supreme among the five media in these functions. In Victor Nell's terms, "it is the affective part of self which the book best serves."
Along with books, cinema continues to share the self-oriented and affective realm, that is, the emotional aspects of self-fulfillment.
Cinema has become altogether different from television, functionally speaking, over the period of 20 years. If in 1970 cinema was considered the universal medium of entertainment, by 1990 it has become an art and behaves like the other arts, in the sense of being correlated with education: the higher the education the higher the consumption of cinema, and of theater, concerts, museums and galleries. This was not true for cinema prior to the inception of television.
The cinema and television do not fulfill each other's functions any more. What we now have is a cinema that is allied with books on the one hand, and television which is allied with radio. This may be truer in Israel than elsewhere, since news and public affairs dominate the broadcasting media, and the populace is highly politicized. It also explains the displacement by television of the functions of the newspaper. In 1970, people apparently thought that TV would join film as a medium of fiction and pleasure, but this expectation has not so far been fulfilled. Instead, TV joined newspapers and radio as a medium of current affairs. Yet the picture may reverse again as television channels multiply, and TV may yet rejoin cinema as a medium of pleasure.
In a word, after 20 years of Israel television, Israelis see it as it saw itself, namely, as a medium of the collectivity. More important than self-gratification, Israelis experienced their one-channel television as a way to connect with the larger society and its civic concerns. Escapism and entertainment are thought to have been better served by other media.
Conclusion
In comparing Simply stated, the data suggest that Israeli society-its values, its cultural practices-is moving slowly away from the collectivism that characterized it (and still does, relative to other societies) and towards greater self-indulgence. But Israel television cultivates collectivismas its viewers and observers both think. If so, and if television can
affect basic values at all, we must infer that the process of value change has been slowed by television. As critical school theorists used to say, non-change or slowed change may be the major effect of the media of mass communication (Katz, 1980) .
Nor can television be held directly responsible for the decline in the patterns of collective consumption of culture and the arts. The most compelling argument we can find to connect the two is that individualistic and interactive patterns of "going out" are, ironically, a reaction against the collectivism of staying home with television. And one wonders, similarly, whether television as a medium has not had a major share in the personalization of politics that is now sweeping the country. Primary elections have displaced the power of the party chiefs in selecting candidates for the parliament, and a populist law has been passed calling for the direct election of the prime minister, to the consternation of most social scientists. There is good reason to believe that television has weakened the party system by moving it indoors and, willy nilly, making it intimate.
Thus, early opposition to the introduction of television in
Israel may have (1) been right, but for the wrong reasons, and (2) been right, but prematurely. Being right for the wrong reasons, the opponents suspected that television harbored a subversive message, not so much realizing that it was the medium itself rather than the message that may be problematic. Being right but prematurely, they could not have anticipated that the function of national integration would be so well served by Israel Television during its first two decades. But they may be right from now on. In the era of commercial, multi-channel narrowcasting, Israel may now have to make way for the escapist self-indulgence prematurely anticipated by the early opponents and latter-day critics like Houston and Postman.
Perhaps even more important than the message or the medium, the influence of television may be related to the form of its institutionalization in a particular society. The manifest and latent effects of a monopoly channel, operated by an independent Authority, in a newly democratic society, with a strong collective will, may be altogether different from the competitive, mixed commercial/public, multi-channel system now beginning to broadcast to a much more individualistic society of Israelis.
To summarize: (1) In spite of a persistent collectivism, we perceive a slow but sure trend towards self-gratification among 4 TV viewing averaged one hour in 1970 when many people were still without sets of their own, and the number of broadcast hours was small.
5. We have roughly comparable data from several European countries and the U.S. However, no systematic analysis has yet been undertaken across cultures.
6. Questions about the utility of the media were asked only with respect to those values considered at least "somewhat important" by the respondent, and with respect to those media to which the respondent was exposed at least to some extent. Thus, a respondent who attributed "no importance at all" to the need "to experience beauty" was not asked which media helped gratify this need. If he/she never goes out to see a film, questions about the helpfulness of cinema were not asked.
7. The discussion that follows is based on changes in the roles of the five media with respect to each of the 35 different needs or values. Table 2 groups these needs into 9 categories, and averages them.
8. That does not mean that the higher standard of living and self·-indulgence is not to be found in Israeli homes. Our argument, rather, is that the home is home to television, and that television is experienced as "we."
*Some of Meyrowitz (1985) also has bearing.
